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STATE EX REL. NEW MEXICO JUDICIAL STANDARDS
COMMISSION V. ESPINOSA: CAN JUDICIAL
INTEGRITY SURVIVE EXECUTIVE CONTROL?
KIMBERLY PARMER-BANNERMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
In a politically charged atmosphere, a divided New Mexico Supreme Court
recently held, in State ex rel. New Mexico Judicial Standards Commission v.
Espinosa,' that the governor has the power, under the New Mexico Constitution,2
to remove the lay members of the Judicial Standards Commission.3 Prior to the
events that led to Espinosa,no other New Mexico governor, nor any governor from
any other state with a similar commission, had used the executive removal power
in such an unfettered fashion.4 Thus, Espinosa raised the issue of whether the New
Mexico Supreme Court's interpretation of article V, section 5 is a valid expansion
of the executive's removal power under the New Mexico Constitution.'
This Note states the case in detail and explains the court's rationale.6 It then
examines why the court allowed the governor to encroach on the judiciary in this
instance and how the holding threatens traditional separation of powers notions.'
In doing so, it will first describe how the court failed to adequately apply its
previous holding from Denish v. Johnson.8 Then, it will examine the court's overly
formalistic approach to the issue at hand when a functional analysis would have
been more appropriate. 9 Lastly, it will discuss how the court's holding threatens the
balance of power between the branches of government in New Mexico by
compromising the basic integrity of the Judicial Branch.l°
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In March 2003, less than two months after taking office, New Mexico's Chief
Executive, Governor Bill Richardson," sent all six lay members of the Judicial

* Class of 2005, University of New Mexico School of Law. I would like to thank Professors Browde and
Blumenfeld for their guidance and insight, which contributed greatly to this Note, and my editor, Ocean MundsDry, for her commitment and encouragement throughout the writing process. I would also like to thank my
husband, Ian Bannerman, for his love, support, and patience in putting up with my political ranting.
1. 2003-NMSC-017, 73 P.3d 197.
2. N.M. CONST. art. V, § 5 (the constitutional provision outlining the executive's power of removal over
executive appointees).
3. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 31,73 P.3d at 205.
4. See Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 53, 73 P.3d at 210 (Bosson, J., dissenting); Barry Massey, Court
HearsArguments in Case overRichardson's Powersto Remove Appointees, ASSOCIATED PRESSNEWSWIRE, May
2, 2003, availableat WESTLAW, 5/2/03 APwIREs 19:12:00.
5. See Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 12, 73 P.3d at 201.
6. See infra Parts n and IV.
7. See infra Part V.
8. 1996-NMSC-005, 910 P.2d 914; see infra accompanying notes 169-198.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 199-267.
10. See infra Part VI.
11. Governor Richardson was elected to the Office of the Governor in November 2002 by the largest margin
in New Mexico since 1964. He was inaugurated in January of 2003. He previously served in the U.S. House for
fifteen years as Representative for the Third Congressional District in New Mexico. Governor Richardson has also
been highly involved in the federal government, serving as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations in 1997 and
Secretary of the Department of Energy under former-President Bill Clinton. Governor'sBiography, availableat
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Standards Commission (the Commission) letters relieving them of their duties and
then proceeded to replace them with his own appointees.' 2 In the letters, the
governor asserted that his power to remove the commissioners was vested in
unspecified provisions of the constitution and laws of New Mexico. 3 None of the
lay members' terms had yet expired and, given the staggered-terms to which they
had been appointed, the terms would have expired one at a time on June thirtieth of
each of the next six years. 14 Those removed, as well as the rest of the sitting
Commission, 5 then filed a writ of quo warranto16 with the New Mexico Supreme
Court, seeking to enjoin the governor from removing the lay members. 7
In challenging the governor's action, Petitioners asserted two claims, both
declaring that the governor did not have authority to remove the lay members under
his article V, section 5 powers.' 8 The Petitioners claimed that allowing such
removal would violate fundamental separation of powers principles 9 and, further,
that article VI, section 32 and its implementing statutes, which create the
Commission and its system of staggered-terms,2" limited the governor's removal
authority found in article V of the constitution. 2' After full briefing and oral
argument, the court denied the writ and held that the governor had the power to
remove the lay members under article V as they were executive appointees.22

http://www.govemor.state.nm.us/NewRichardsonbio.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2004).
12. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 3, 73 P.3d at 199; Respondents' Response and Request for Dismissal
of Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto at 2, Espinosa (No. 28,040).
13. Respondents' Response at 2, Espinosa (No. 28,040).
14. NMSA 1978, § 34-10-1(A) (1968).
15. The Petitioners consisted of commissioners Douglas Turner, Teresa Chaparro, the Honorable Frank
Allen, the Honorable Frank Wilson, the Honorable Buddy Hall, Kathleen Brandt, Mark Filosa, Marie GarciaShaffner, Daniel Houck, Francis McKinney-Ferguson, and James Tooke. The Respondents consisted of newly
appointed commissioners Valerie Espinosa, Zolene Knott, Esther Marquez, Paul Sena, Dr. Gloria Taradash, Shirley
Williams, and Real Party in Interest, Governor Bill Richardson.
16. A writ of quo warranto is "used to inquire into the authority by which a public office is held or a
franchise is claimed." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1265 (7th ed. 1999). While the writ was originally created under
common law, in New Mexico the writ is statutory and can be brought "when any person shall usurp, intrude into
or unlawfully hold or exercise any public office...." NMSA 1978, § 44-3-4(A) (1919). In Espinosa, as a preliminary
matter, Respondents claimed that the writ of quo warranto was improperly used by the Petitioners, arguing that a
writ of mandamus or prohibition would have been more appropriate. The court held that quo warranto could be
used by the Petitioners, stating that "even if a different writ would be more appropriate, this [c]ourt ultimately needs
to decide whether the Governor has the authority to remove sitting members of the Commission before their terms
expire." Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 4, 73 P.3d at 199.
17. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-0 17, 1 1,73 P.3d at 198; Petitioners' B fief in Support for Writ of Quo Warranto
at 4, Espinosa (No. 28,040).
18. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 8, 73 P.3d at 200; Petitioners' Brief at 5, 8, Espinosa (No. 28,040).
19. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 8, 73 P.3d at 200.
20. See infra Part II.A.
21. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 8, 73 P.3d at 200; see also N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32 (the Judicial
Standards Commission provision); NMSA 1978, §§ 34-10-1 to 34-10-2 (the implementing statutes for article VI,
section 32); N.M. CONST. art. V, § 5 (the constitutional provision creating the executive's removal authority over
executive appointees); Petitioners' Brief at 5, 8, 10, Espinosa (No. 28,040).
22. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017,1 27, 73 P.3d at 204.
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Two sections of the New Mexico Constitution are implicated in Espinosa:article
VI, section 3223 and article V, section 5.24 A brief review of each is essential to
understanding the case. Also, the background and reasoning of the court's prior
holding in Denish v. Johnson,5 while not fully analyzed here, is important to
understanding the court's reasoning in Espinosa.
A. Article VI, Section 32
Article VI, section 32 establishes the Commission, its composition, and its
duties.26 The Commission is comprised of eleven individuals: three judges or
justices, two lawyers, and six lay members. Its main duty is to hold hearings and
investigate possible misconduct, disability, intemperance, or basic failure or
inability of a judge to do his or her duties.28 After such investigation, if the
Commission finds "good cause," it must recommend to the New Mexico Supreme
Court either disciplinary action, removal, or forced retirement of the judge. 29 It is
then up to the court to follow or reject the recommendation based on a review of the
Commission proceedings.3"
In New Mexico, the Commission has been serving as the "watchdog for the
judiciary" since it adoption in 1967. 3' Prior to its establishment, the only way to
remove a judge from office was impeachment.32 Based on the recommendation of
two successive governors,33 supported by a detailed report of the Constitutional
Revision Commission,3 4 the New Mexico Legislature proposed an amendment to
the state constitution to create the Commission, which was made law by popular
vote. 35 The overall purpose was to provide the judiciary with "appropriate judicial

23. See infra Part IH.A (discussing article VI, section 32, the constitutional provision that creates the
Commission).
24. See infra Part lIT.B (discussing article V, section 5, the constitutional provision granting the executive
removal power over gubernatorial appointees).
25. 1996-NMSC-005,910 P.2d 914.
26. N.M. CONST. art VI, § 32.
27. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 6, 73 P.3d at 199 (citing N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32).
28. N.M. CONST. art VI, § 32. For examples of formal proceedings before the Commission, see 2002
JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMM'N ANN. REP., at 19-46.

29. N.M. CONST. art VI, § 32.
30. Id. (during its review, the court may also allow for the introduction of additional evidence).
31. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 11, 73 P.3d at 200.
32. Id. 1 10, 73 P.3d at 200 (citing the 1964 N.M. CONST. REVISION COMM'N REP., at 117).
33. Governor Campbell first recommended the Commission in 1964, and Governor Cargo made the same
recommendation in 1967. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 10, 73 P.3d at 200.
34. 1967 N.M. CONST. REVISION COMM'N REP. 88-90. The Constitutional Revision Commission consists
of eleven members, one from each judicial district in New Mexico. There are also four legislative advisory
members. The Constitutional Revision Commission is charged with the examination of the New Mexico
Constitution, and those of other states, and recommends changes to the New Mexico Constitution if deemed
desirable. If the majority of the Commission's members approve the changes, the Commission then drafts
legislation to accomplish the changes. 1964 N.M. CONST. REVISION COMM'N REP., at iii, vii-xii.
35. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 1 10, 73 P.3d at 200. The constitutional provision was subsequently
amended in 1998 to add two more members to the commission, a magistrate and an additional lay member. N.M.
CONST. art. VI, § 32; see also New Mexico Legislative Council Service, Highlights of the Forty-thirdLegislature,
FirstSession 44 (1997) (outlining the constitutional amendment proposed by the forty-third legislature to amend
article VI, section 32).
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disciplinary machinery. 36 Another reason for the adoption of the Commission was
to protect the integrity and independence of the Judicial Branch.3 7 The choice to
include executive appointed lay members to the Commission was in furtherance of
these ideals.38
B. Article V, Section 5
Article V, section 5 of the New Mexico Constitution provides in part that "[tihe
governor shall nominate and, by and with the consent of the senate, appoint all
officers whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided for and may
remove any officer appointed by him unless otherwise provided by law."39 In 1988,
article V was amended to eliminate the provision requiring the governor to find
cause, such as incompetence or malfeasance, before exercising removal.' It was
argued that the provision as it existed before the amendment forced the governor to
build a case against one of his appointees before removal could be sought." In
furtherance of their argument, the proponents claimed that "[a] governor must have
the power to remove appointees without fear of prolonged legal challenges to the
removal and the media exposure that goes along with these public dismissals."42
In opposition to those who sought to expand the executive's removal power were
those who argued that executive appointments would become too political if the
governor could remove the appointees at any time and without cause.43 Opponents
feared that the governor would look more at the personality and political ideology
of the appointee, rather than the appointee's actual job performance." Opponents
also thought important qualities of executive commissions, such as "stability and
diversity," would be lost if the executive were allowed to remove appointees
without cause.45 Such qualities are also furthered by the choice to use staggered

36. Espinosa,2003-NMSC-017, 8,73 P.3d at 200 (citing the 1964 N.M. CONST. REVISION COMM'N REP.
116). The legislature demonstrated its intent to adopt such an entity in the 1964 Report of the Constitutional
Revision Commission, which stated, "In order to achieve an efficient and well disciplined judicial system
possessing the highest degree of integrity, it is felt that an independent commission is necessary to oversee and
investigate performance, conduct and fitness of members of the judiciary." Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 10, 73
P.3d at 200 (quoting the 1964 N.M. CONST. REVISION COMM'N REP. 116).
37. See Note, The Commission Removal Plan:A CorrectiveRemedy for JudicialMisconduct in Iowa, 55
IOWA L. REV. 1020, 1031-32 (1970) [hereinafter Commission Removal Plan]; Note, Judicial
Removal-Establishment of Judicial Commission for Removal of Judges Precludes Legislative Investigation of
JudicialMisconduct, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1002, 1008-09 (1971) [hereinafter Judicial Removal]; Note, Remedies
for JudicialMisconduct and Disability:Removal and Disciplineof Judges, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 149, 196-97 (1966)
[hereinafter Remedies].
38. See infra notes 257-264 and accompanying text.
39. N.M. CONST. art. V, § 5. Article V was enacted as part of the original New Mexico Constitution in
1912. Id.
40. Espinosa,2003-NMSC-01 7, 26,73 P.3d at 204; New Mexico Legislative Council Service, Highlights
ofthe Thirty-Eighth Legislature,Second Session and Second Special Session 6 (1988) (outlining the constitutional
amendment to alter article V, section 5 proposed by the thirty-eighth legislature).
41. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 26, 73 P.3d at 204 (quoting New Mexico Legislative Council Service,
ConstitutionalAmendments Proposedby the Legislature in 1988 and Arguments Forand Against 203.2, at 7-8
(1988)).
42. New Mexico Legislative Council Service, ConstitutionalAmendments Proposedby the Legislature in
1988 and Arguments For and Against 203.2, at 8 (1988).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 8-9.
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terms for such entities.46 Despite these arguments, the amendment allowing the
governor to remove executive appointees without cause unless "otherwise provided
by law" passed in 1988. 47
C. Denish v. Johnson
The Denish court addressed the executive's power to appoint under article XX,
section 5 of the constitution when the legislature is not in session. 48 The court's
examination of whether the removal power is limited when appointees serve
staggered terms is relevant here. 49 Denish involved a writ of mandamus action filed
by two regents at a state universityi 0 The regents were appointed mid-term by thenGovernor Bruce King and subsequently told mid-term by Governor Gary Johnson,
who succeeded King, that their terms had expired and their successors had been
appointed. 51 In examining the staggered-term issue, the Denish court articulated a
test to determine whether staggered terms are formal or informal and examined the
5
policies behind both forms2.
The court held that, if a governor chose to replace
incumbent appointees under a formal staggered-term system, the new appointees
could only serve for the remainder of the original board member's term. 3
Furthermore, in its examination of article V, executive removal authority, Denish
held that the governor did not have the authority to remove board of regents

46. Id.
47. N.M. CONST. art. V, § 5.
48. Denish, 1996-NMSC-005, U 1, 19, 910 P.2d at 917, 920. Article XX, section 5 of the New Mexico
Constitution provides in pertinent part that when a vacancy occurs in an office appointed by the governor while
the senate is not in session, the governor shall appoint a new person to fill the seat until the senate is in session
again. Once in session, the senate must confirm the appointee. N.M. CONST. art. XX, § 5.
49. See Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 1 19-22, 73 P.3d at 202-03 (addressing Denish's discussion of the
function of staggered terms on executive removal).
50. Denish, 1996-NMSC-005,
1,910 P.2d at 917.
51. Id.7 1-9,910 P.2d at 917-18.
52. The Denish court sad that under a formal staggering system "the objective is the perpetuation of a rigid
staggering plan." Id. at 38, 910 P.2d at 924. The court went on to define a three-element test for determining if
a formal staggering system is required. Formal staggering is required if the law governing the appointment of board
or commission members includes "1) shortened terms for initial appointees, 2) full terms for subsequent appointees,
and 3) a requirement that vacancies be filled only for the remainder of the vacated term." Id. at 1 41,910 P.2d at

925. Conversely, in a system of informal staggering, more important than rigid staggering is the intention that the
appointee "serve the maximum number of years as provided by law." Id. 39, 910 P.2d at 924. A law setting up
such an informal system first sets out the full term length and initially lays out a series of staggered terms but falls
to stipulate how a vacancy can be filled only for the remainder of a term left before completed. Id. The Denish court
also laid out four policies behind the use of staggered terms in boards and commissions whose officials and
members are appointed by the governor, stating that both the formal and informal systems support the policies but
to "differing degrees." Id. 40, 910 P.2d at 924. The first policy underlying the staggering system is that such a
system "preserve(s) continuity in the public entity by preventing the theoretical possibility of all appointees being
replaced at once." Id. The court went on to say that such continuity alleviated the possibility of "erratic changes
of the entity's policies." Id. The second policy underlying the staggered-term system is that the staggering shields
the commission or board, which serves a public purpose, from being influenced or coerced by politics. Id. The third
policy is that such a system creates a "tension" between board members because they come from different
administrations. Id. This tension can promote creativity on the board because of varying political and ideological
ideals between the members. Id. Last, the court said that the staggering system "promotes institutional memory by
assuring that older appointees have the opportunity to pass on important knowledge and experience to newer
appointees." Id.
53. Denish, 1996-NMSC-005, 1 41, 910 P.2d at 924-25.
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members because article XII, section 5413 made specific provisions for their removal
that limited removal under article V.

Thus, the New Mexico Supreme Court's holding in Denish is important in
analyzing Espinosa,in that it dealt specifically with how staggered terms affect the
executive removal power. Specifically, the Denish court iterated an important test
in determining how much the executive is limited by staggered terms in its analysis
of formal versus informal systems as well as the policies behind them. The Denish
test and the policies behind it are important to the analysis of the Espinosa holding.
IV. RATIONALE
In Espinosa,the court determined that the governor had the power under the New
Mexico Constitution, specifically under article V, to remove the lay members of the
Commission at any time and without cause. In making its determination, the court
addressed two issues: whether the governor (1) violated traditional notions of
separation of powers and (2) exceeded his scope under article V as it is limited by
article VI.5 The majority opinion,56 written by Chief Justice Maes, found neither
claim persuasive. On the separation of powers issue, the majority reasoned that
while there may be some encroachment by the executive into the judiciary in this
instance, the level of encroachment was not high enough to limit traditional judicial
functions in a way that warranted the court to hold the removal unconstitutional.57
The majority also held that the text of article VI could not impliedly limit article V
because article V was an express grant of broad executive power to which only
express limitation applies.5 8
Justices Bosson and Minzner dissented from the majority, 59 arguing that the
encroachment by the executive into the judiciary did threaten judicial independence. 60 Moreover, both justices reasoned that the legislature had limited the
executive removal power through the legislature's use of staggered terms and the
Commission's placement and function in the Judicial Branch.6 1
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority examined the two separate challenges to the governor's removal of
the Commission' s lay members and found neither persuasive in limiting the removal
power in this case. 62 As to the separation of powers issue, the majority concluded
that the constitutional provision locating the Commission in the judicial article was
54. Id.
53-54,910P.2dat927.
55. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 8, 73 P.3d at 200.
56. The court was split three to two. See Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 34, 73 P.3d at 205.
57. Id. 1 12-17, 73 P.3d at 201-02.
58. Id. 11 18-27, 73 P.3d at 202-04. Justice Sema authored an opinion specially concurring with the
majority. Id. It 35-40, 73 P.3d at 205-07 (Sema, J., concurring) (In his opinion, Justice Sema emphasized his
belief that the entire issue could be resolved if both article V and article VI were read harmoniously. He also wrote
to rebut many of the opinions stated in the dissenting opinions by both Justices Bosson and Minzner).
59. Id. 7141-76, 73 P.3d at 207-15.

60. Id.
61. Id. ( 44-53, 74-76, 73 P.3d at 207-10, 214-15; see infra notes 137-147 and accompanying text.
62. The two issues were (1) whether the governor had violated the separation of powers doctrine by
removing all the lay members at one time and (2) whether article VI, section 32 limits the removal power under
article V, section 5. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 18, 73 P.3d at 200.
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of some importance,63 but ultimately, the function of the Commission, as well as the
Judicial Branch, was not sufficiently threatened by the governor's actions to warrant
holding that separation of powers had been violated. 6' In other words, the Executive
Branch was not encroaching on the Judicial Branch here. The holding was based on
the express wording of article V65 and, in particular, the finding that the governor
was not keeping the Commission from "accomplishing its constitutionally assigned
function"66 by removing and replacing the lay members.6 7
In making its conclusion regarding encroachment, the majority examined the
traditional role of the Judicial Branch in New Mexico and found its major function
was to construe the laws and to "render and enforce a judgment."6 The court's
examination of the Commission found it to be solely an advisory board that makes
recommendations to the New Mexico Supreme Court on disciplinary matters.6 9
Thus, the Commission played no role in the essential functions of the judiciary.7"
However, the majority did concede that there might be some encroachment by
the executive into the judiciary here.7 ' As a result, the court addressed the issue of
whether the governor had infringed enough to warrant action by the court.7 2 It first
explained that the New Mexico Constitution specifically grants the lay members a
majority of the seats on the Commission to protect the Commission's independence
from judicial control.73 Moreover, the majority concluded that allowing the
governor to remove the six executive appointees does not increase the executive's

63. Id. 1 14, 73 P.3d at 201 (finding that "the Commission is constitutionally committed to the Judicial
Branch"; thus, its functions "are now judicial functions").
64. Id. (H 14-17, 73 P.3d at 201-02.
65. Id. 12-17, 73 P.3d at 200-02. The court reasoned that the New Mexico Constitution allowed such
encroachment because article VI, section 32 gives the governor the power to appoint the majority of the
Commission members. Id. 1 11, 73 P.3d at 200. The court opined that the Commission's history explained why
the legislature allowed such encroachment. Id. 9 10-11, 73 P.3d at 200 (explaining that two former governors had
recommended ajudicial standards commission because of lack of adequate disciplinary action over the judiciary).
Due to this history, while the Commission was to be located in the judiciary, the legislature gave the executive the
large role of appointing the majority of the commissioners, thus permitting encroachment by the executive into the
Judicial Branch.
66. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 12, 73 P.3d at 200-01 (quoting State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998NMSC-0 15, 1 23, 961 P.2d 768).
67. Id. N 12-17, 73 P.3d at 200-02.
68. Id. 1 13,73 P.3d at 201 (citing Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 493,502,697 P.2d 493,502 (N.M. Ct. App.
1984) (rev'd in part on other grounds by Zouhar, 102 N.M. 482, 697 P.2d 482).
69. Id.
70. Id. The court also considered the U.S. Supreme Court case Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
384-85 (1989), because it found the situation examined there to be similar to the one before the court. There the
Court found that the Federal Sentencing Commission, which is located in the Judicial Branch and whose role it
is to determine federal sentencing guidelines, did not exercise judicial power although located in the Judicial
Branch. Mistretta,488 U.S. at 396-97. As a result, the MistrettaCourt found that the Sentencing Commission was
an independent body, unattached to the judiciary. Id. The Espinosacourt found the Judicial Standards Commission
similar in that its creators stressed its independence and that it does not function in traditional judicial ways.
Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 1 13, 73 P.3d at 201. Thus, it found the governor's actions did not infringe on the
judiciary's traditional functions of construing the law and rendering judgments. Id.
71. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 9114, 73 P.3d at 201 (The majority based this argument on the fact that
the Commission is located in the judiciary and thus functions within that branch. Therefore, allowing the governor
to appoint the majority of the members does constitute infringement by the executive on the judiciary.).
72. Id. 1 17, 73 P.3d at 202.
73. Id. 1 15, 73 P.3d at 201 (the court explained that such protection was probably necessary to keep the
judiciary from "unduly influencing the investigations of the Commission").
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control over the Commission for several reasons:74 first, on the eleven-member75
committee there are five other members over whom the governor has no control;
second, the New Mexico Supreme Court "retains the ultimate decision making
authority," because, while it takes into consideration the Commission's recommen76
dations, it makes the final decisions as to what action, if any, should be taken;
third, because all of the Commission proceedings are conducted in secret, the
governor would not have access to any of the investigations before the Commission
until after a recommendation is made by the court and the records become public.77
The majority also stated that the executive removal power will more likely be used
by the governor to remove a commissioner whose performance was lacking rather
than to try to control the Commission;78 without the removal power the governor
would have no way to remove a commissioner. 79 Thus, the Espinosa majority
concluded that separation of powers was not violated because the governor was not
infringing on the essential functions of the Judicial Branch by removing the lay
members of the Commission.8 °
After concluding that separation of powers was not violated, the majority turned
to the second issue: whether "the text of Article VI, Section 32 impliedly limits the
executive's removal power."'" First, the Espinosamajority rejected the Petitioners'
claim that the governor was limited in removal of the lay members because they
serve under a system of staggered terms.82 Second, the majority found that the
language of article VI did not limit the governor as the Petitioners claimed, as it
only addresses the governor's power to fill vacancies on the Commission, not create
vacancies through removal.83 Third, the majority did not find persuasive Petitioners'84
claim that a limit on article V removal was inherent in the purpose of article VI.

74. Id.
75. Id. (finding that the governor has no power to appoint or remove these five members).
76. Id.; see also N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32.
77. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 15, 73 P.3d at 201.
78. Id. 1 17, 73 P.3d at 202. But note here that the facts of the case do not support this contention as the
governor had no reason to remove any of the lay members in this instance and in fact praised each of them for their
service. Respondents' Response at 2, Espinosa (No. 28,040).
79. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 17, 73 P.3d at 202. There would remain in the legislature the power to
remove members of the Commission if liable for "crimes, misdemeanors and malfeasance in office." Id. 17 n.2,
73 P.3d at 202 n.2 (quoting N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 36). At this point the court also examined Horton v.
McLaughlin, 821 A.2d 947, 952 (N.H. 2003), as an illustration of when removal of judicial members by another
branch of government would be an unconstitutional infringement on the Judicial Branch. Horton dealt with the
Legislative Branch's power to impeach justices in New Hampshire. Id. The impeached justices claimed that the
process of impeachment threatened the independence of the judiciary by allowing the Legislative Branch to impose
"financial hardship on individual judges for reasons substantially motivated by grounds other than those set forth
in the constitution." Id. at 952. The Horton court found that, if such action, the impeachment, was motivated by
the decisions of thejustices, separation of powers would be violated. Id. The Espinosacourt agreed with the Horton
example that the governor would be encroaching if motivated by the decisions of the members of the judiciary but
found no violation present in the instant case. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 16, 73 P.3d at 201-02.
80. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017,
14-17, 73 P.3d at 201-02.
81. Id. 1 18, 73 P.3d at 202.
82. Id. U 18-21, 73 P.3d at 202-03.
83. Id. 1 23, 73 P.3d at 203.
84. Id. 1 24, 73 P.3d at 203 (the Petitioners claimed that the idea behind the structure of the Commission
was to keep it independent and non-political); see also Petitioners' Brief at 6, Espinosa (No. 28,040).
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The majority held that none of the implied limits claimed by the Petitioners was
85
enough to override the express removal authority of the governor under article V.
The Espinosacourt concluded that staggered terms alone are not enough to limit
the express removal power of the governor.8 6 In its analysis, the majority distinguished its previous holding in Denish87 because it dealt with "an attempt to alter
the length of terms themselves," rather than removal of appointees. 8 While the
Espinosa court acknowledged the importance of the staggered-term system, 89 it
found that Denish did not prevent the governor from removing appointees under
article V. 9' Rather, Denish simply proscribed the governor from making a
fundamental shift in the terms.9 ' As a result, the majority found Denish did not
create the rule that the governor can never use the removal power under article V
over a member of an entity that serves staggered terms.92
Next, the majority examined other executive commissions with staggered terms
that also include express limitations on removal of their members.93 Through this
examination, the majority found that express language limiting article V removal
would have to be included in article VI to limit the governor's authority to remove
the lay members. 94 The majority reasoned that, under both article XII, section 13
and article V, section 14, the drafters of the provisions had included language that
expressly limited the governor's removal power under article V. 9' Consequently, the
Espinosamajority found the language in those provisions persuasive in holding that
staggered terms alone do not limit the governor's removal power under article V.96
The majority argued that to hold so would render other limiting language
unnecessary if staggered terms were in place.97 The Espinosa majority, therefore,

85. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 25, 73 P.3d at 203-04.
86. Id. 1 22, 73 P.3d at 203. Petitioners argued that the language in article VI, section 32, dealing with the
appointment of the commissioners "for five-year staggered-terms as may be provided by law," limited a blanket
removal of all the lay members, as such removal would nullify the express provision for staggered terms.
Petitioners' Brief at 8, Espinosa (No. 28,040).
87. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017,
19-21,73 P.3d at 202; Denish, 1996-NMSC-005, 36-41,910 P.2d
at 923-25; see supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
88. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 21,73 P.3d at 203.
89. The court specifically stated that they would "continue to recognize the value of staggered terms" but
felt that the Denish holding did not preclude removal by the executive of appointees that serve staggered terms.
Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 121, 73 P.3d at 203.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. 22, 73 P.3d at 203 (comparing article VI, section 32 to both article XIL section 13, the provision
creating the board of regents for the New Mexico educational system, and article V, Section 14, the provision
creating the State Highway Commission); see N.M. CONST. art. XII, § 13; N.M. CONST. art. V, § 14 (the limitations
on removal of the State Highway commissioners were recently terminated by the passage of NMSA 1978, § 67-3-5
(2003), and now reads that the commissioners serve at the pleasure of the governor, instead of reading that the
commissioners can only be removed for "incompetence, neglect of duty or malfeasance").
94. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 122, 73 P.3d at 203.
95. Id. Article XU, section 13 states that members of the board of regents "shall not be removed except for
incompetence, neglect of duty or malfeasance in office." N.M. CONST. art XII, § 13. At the time of the Espinosa
hearing, article V, section 14 dealt with removal of members of the State Transportation Commission and stated
that, "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of Article 5, Section 5 of the constitution of New Mexico, state highway
commissioners shall only be removed as provided by law." N.M. CONST. art V, § 14.
96. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 22, 73 P.3d at 203.
97. Id.
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held that express limiting language is needed to restrict article V removal, even if
the legislature included staggered terms.98
Further, the majority quickly disposed of the argument that, even if the
governor's removal power over the Commission was not limited by the staggeredterm system, an implied limit could be found in the language of article VI, 99 as it
only listed how to fill a vacancy, not create one. The majority examined other
commissions set up by the legislature that provide for both the executive power to
remove and fill vacancies I° and iterated the rule that constitutional provisions
should be read in harmony whenever possible.'O' The Espinosa majority reasoned
that the distinction between article VI and article V, where one deals with the power
to fill a vacancy and the other deals with the power to remove, does not make each
power "mutually exclusive, and one does not negate the other."' 2 The majority
found that both articles implicated the executive's power over the Commission, and
that the powers to remove and fill vacancies are not antithetical. As such, the
majority opined that these powers can, and should be, interpreted in a way that
harmonizes, not in a way that makes them contradictory.' 3 Therefore, no implied
limit on the executive removal power was found in the language of article VI.
Lastly, the majority rejected the argument that, even if no limit could be found
in the language of article VI, such a limit is "inherent" in the provision's purpose. "
This argument was based on the idea that the intent behind the Commission was to
keep it "independent and non-political."'l 5 In holding that such implied limits could
not be used to limit express power, such as executive removal, the majority
examined its prior holdings addressing article V removal.'0 6
From the two cases examined,'0 7 the majority developed several reasons for
allowing the governor to have removal power over the Commission. Primarily, the
majority explained that the executive must be able to control his or her administration, because it is the executive office holder that is held politically liable for the
08
entity's actions, and the removal authority provides the mechanism for control.
Thus, the constitutional drafters trusted the executive to be able to "deal fairly with

98. Id.
99. Id. 23, 73 P.3d at 203 (the language of the section deals only with how a vacancy can be filled by the
governor, not how a vacancy can be created; thus, Petitioners asserted that the legislative intent must have been
"to deny the Governor the authority to remove members").
100. Id. (citing as an example NMSA 1978, § 61-15-3(C)-(D) (1987)).
101. Id. (citing State v. Sandoval, 95 N.M. 254, 256, 620 P.2d 1279, 1281 (1980)).
102. Id. Justice Serna's concurring opinion emphasized his strong belief in the harmonious reading of
constitutional provisions whenever possible. He stated that the two provisions at issue in Espinosacould easily be
read in harmony and thus should be construed in that manner. Id. 35, 73 P.3d at 205-06 (Sema, J., concurring).
103. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 23,73 P.3d at 203 (citing Sandoval, 95 N.M. at 256,620 P.2d at 1281).
104. Id. 24, 73 P.3d at 203; see also Petitioners' Brief at 6, Espinosa (No. 28,040).
105. Petitioners' Brief at 7, Espinosa (No. 28,040) (the Petitioners stated that to have executive removal
power apply in a way that allowed for removal of all the lay members would allow the governor control of the
Commission expressly in contradiction to this intent).
106. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 25,73 P.3d at 203-04 (citing Flaska v. State, 51 N.M. 13, 20, 177 P.2d
174, 178 (1946) (standing for the proposition that, when the New Mexico Constitution was drafted, it was done
completely and carefully and little was left to implication)).
107. State ex rel. Ulrick v. Sanchez, 32 N.M. 265, 255 P. 1077 (1926) (addressing the governor's power to
remove a member of the tax commission); State ex rel. Duran v. Anaya, 102 N.M. 609, 698 P.2d 882 (1985)
(addressing the governor's power to remove a member of the State Board of Barber Examiners).
108. Ulrick, 255 P. at 1086.
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the office holders whom he was empowered to appoint."'" Also, the governor "has
plenary authority to remove his appointees unless the Legislature has imposed an
express limit on that power.""' Moreover, the people of New Mexico had
broadened the executive's power over the Commission in 1988, when article V was
amended to eliminate the provision requiring the governor to find "incompetency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance" of an appointee before exercising removal."' The
majority reasoned that the people did not limit the removal power as exercised in
this context and, thus, no limit could be implied." 2
Finally, comparing other executive commissions to the Judicial Standards
Commission, the majority found that many of them contained express limiting
language." 3 This finding, the majority concluded, further supported the argument
that the removal power cannot be limited unless done so expressly by the
legislature. 114 Based on these reasons, the majority concluded that, without explicit
limitation from the legislature, "[t]he removal authority applies indiscriminately to
all gubernatorial appointees," even those found in the Judicial Branch.' 1'
Thus, the Espinosamajority dismissed both of Petitioners' claims. 1 16 While the
majority acknowledged the location of the Commission in the Judicial Branch, "'
the governor was not limiting the Commission's function or the overall function of
the judiciary by removing the lay members; therefore, separation of powers
principles were not violated.118 Furthermore, the majority found none of the implied
limitations suggested by Petitioners, including the legislature's express choice to
use a staggered-term system, could limit the express power granted to the governor
under article V.'19 The majority held that it is the province of the legislature to
expressly limit removal, not thejudiciary.12 ° As a result, the majority concluded that
the removal of the Commission's lay members was not in violation of the New
Mexico Constitution.'21

109. Id. (the Ulrick court did acknowledge that the removal power may be abused but found that the power
of government must be placed somewhere and in this instance it was placed in the hands of the executive).
110. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 26,73 P.3d at 204 (emphasis added); see also Duran, 102 N.M. at 611,
698 P.2d at 884 (holding that unless the legislature expressly includes limitations on the executive removal
authority, such as requiring notice and hearing before removal is allowed, there are no limitations on removal
because it is an express power of the Executive Branch).
111. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 126,73 P.3d at 204; see also N.M. CONST. art. V, § 5 (as amended 1988).
112. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 127,73 P.3d at 204; see also N.M. CONST. art. V,§ 5 (as amended 1988).
113. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, [t1
28-29, 73 P.3d at 204-05.
114. Id.
115. Id.
1 27, 73 P.3d at 204.
116. The two issues were (1) whether the governor had violated the separation of powers doctrine by
removing all the lay members at one time and (2) whether article VI, section 32 limits the removal power under
article V, section 5. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 1 8, 73 P.3d at 200.
117. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 14, 73 P.3d at 201 (finding that "the Commission is constitutionally
committed to the Judicial Branch"; thus its functions "are now judicial functions").
118. Id. 14-17, 73 P.3d at 201-02.
119. Id. 18-31, 73 P.3d at 202-05.
120. Id.
H 30-31, 73 P.3d at 205.
121. Id. 1,73 P.3d at 200.
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B. The Dissenting and ConcurringOpinions
Justices Bosson and Minzner, writing separate dissenting opinions, disagreed
22
with the majority's holding and concurred fully in each other's dissents. The core
of Justice Bosson's opinion was the "essential need for independence" of the
Commission."' He reasoned thatjudicial independence trumps any conflict between
the two constitutional provisions in question.'24 Justice Bosson also reasoned that
the governor's article V removal power does not extend to the Commission lay
members because the Commission is located "outside the Executive Branch of
government." '25 Justice Minzner's opinion is founded on the judicial nature of the
Commission because of its function and placement in the Judicial Branch. 2 6 Justice
Minzner's opinion revolved around the infringement by the executive on both the
judicial and legislative branches through use of the removal authority in this
situation. 2 ' Justice Serna also wrote an opinion separate from the majority,
28
concurring fully with that opinion but emphasizing his rationale.' The bulk of
rebutted the points made in both Justice Bosson and Justice
Justice Serna's opinion
29
Minzner's dissents.1
Justice Bosson's analysis began with the basic conflict between the two
provisions. 30 He outlined the policies underpinning the creation of the Commission,
its duties, and the terms of its membership, i.e., staggered terms.' 3' In light of this
background, Justice Bosson concluded that the "Constitution's express choice of
staggered-terms is significant. 132
Unlike the majority, who found the Denish holding not to limit the removal
power over appointees who serve staggered terms, Justice Bosson believed that the
express choice to use such a system does limit replacement of members of such
commissions.3 Justice Bosson reasoned that the policies behind staggered terms,
as discussed in Denish,3 4 particularly the need for an independent Commission
because of its quasi-judicial function and the people's express choice to include a

122.

Id. (1941-76, 73 P.3d at 207-15.

123. Id. 142, 73 P.3d at 207 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id. (Bosson, J., dissenting).
Id. 9141, 73 P.3d at 207 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
Id. H 57-58, 73 P.3d at 211 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
Id. 1 57, 73 P.3d at 211 (Minzner, J., dissenting).

128. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, V 35-40, 73 P.3d at 205-07 (Sema, J., concurring).
129. Id. I91 36-39, 73 P.3d at 206-07 (Sema, J., concurring).
130.

/d. 9144, 73 P.3d at 207 (Bosson, J., dissenting).

131. Id. 1144-47, 73 P.3d at 207-08 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
132. Id. 9 48, 73 P.3d at 208 (Bosson, J., dissenting). Article VI, section 32 expressly provides that the
Commission's lay members are appointed by the governor "for five-year staggered terms as may be provided by
law." N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32. The provision is implemented through many statutes including NMSA 1978, §
34-10-1 (1999), which implements the terms of the commission and "provides for the staggered-term appointment
of initial lay members...and stipulates, thereafter, that these positions shall be filled in such a manner that one term
expires on June 30 each year." Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 9147, 73 P.3d at 208 (quoting NMSA 1978, § 34-10I(A)).
133. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 9149, 73 P.3d at 208-09 (Justice Bosson stated that the appointees to a
board that serve under a staggered-term system cannot be "replaced at any time for any reason.") (Bosson, J.,
dissenting).
134. See supranote 52 (describing the formal/informal staggering systems and the policies such systems are
put in place to protect) (Bosson, J., dissenting).
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staggered-term system, must limit the governor's power. 35 Justice Bosson
concluded that to allow the majority's interpretation would reduce the system "to
constitutional insignificance, a mere formality, easily subverted," which would
upset the function of
36 the system in preserving the independence of the Commission
and others like it. 1
Next, Justice Bosson turned to the history and location of the Commission. He
argued that it was located in the Judicial Branch to ensure its independence and that
to allow the governor to remove its members was a violation of basic separation of
powers principles. 137 While Justice Bosson agreed with the majority's use of
previous precedent in reasoning that the governor's removal power over executive
officers is expansive, he argued that the Commission is different because it is part
of the JudicialBranch, not the executive.139 Furthermore, Justice Bosson reasoned
that not only did the Commission's location remove it from control of any one
Branch, so did its function. l, This conclusion mirrored that of Justice Minzner's
dissent.
Justice Minzner's opinion was similarly founded on the judicial nature of the
Commission because of both its function and placement within the Judicial
Branch.' 4 ' Justice Minzner's opinion revolved around the infringement by the
executive on both the Judicial and Legislative branches through use of the
executive's removal authority.' 42 She argued that, because the Commission is such
an "integral part of the Judicial Branch,"' 4 3 allowing the governor to remove and
replace all six lay members would infringe on its independence.'" She reasoned that
the Commission functioned as a member of the Judicial Branch because it provided
administrative support to the New Mexico Supreme Court's judicial powers and

135. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017,
48-49, 73 P.3d at 208-09 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
136. Id. 1 49, 73 P.3d at 209 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
137. Id. 1 52, 73 P.3d at 209. (Bosson, J., dissenting).
138. See supranotes 107-112 and accompanying text; see also State ex rel. Ulrick v. Sanchez, 32 N.M. 265,
255 P. 1077 (1926) (addressing the governor's power to remove a member of the tax commission); State ex rel.
Duran v. Anaya, 102 N.M. 609, 698 P.2d 882 (1985) (addressing the governor's power to remove a member of the
State Board of Barber Examiners).
139. Espinosa,2003-NMSC-017, 51-52,73 P.3d at 209 (Bosson, J., dissenting). Justice Bosson also used
the court's holding in Ulrick to further his point. Id. 53,73 P.3d at 210 (Bosson, J., dissenting). He rationalized
that Ulrick demonstrated that the removal power of article V is a "creature of the executive branch" put in place
because of "concerns over officers within the executive branch," and to expand its use to the Commission was an
overbroad interpretation of its power. Id. (Bosson, J., dissenting) (citing Ulrick, 32 N.M. at 282, 255 P. at 1083).
140. Espinosa,2003-NMSC-017, 52,73 P.3d at 209 (Bosson, J., dissenting). Justice Bosson also took issue
with the majority's argument that, because the legislature had never expressly restricted the removal power over
the Commission members, as it had done to other commissions, the power applied to the Commission members.
Id. 54, 73 P.3d at 210 (Bosson, J., dissenting). Justice Bosson found this reasoning unpersuasive. He believed
that, if the Commission was an executive agency, the argument had merit, but because it lay in the Judicial Branch,
its independence is shielded from the executive and, as a result, article V is limited by article VI. Id. 55, 73 P.3d
at 210 (Bosson, J., dissenting). He found no need for such a limiting statute because the legislature had a hand in
creating the Commission and, thus, had a hand in placing it in the judiciary to preserve its independence. Id.
(Bosson, J., dissenting). Another statute expressly limiting the governor would be repetitive of what the legislature
had already done by placing the Commission in the Judicial Branch, away from the executive and that office's
removal power. Id. (Bosson, J., dissenting).
141. Id. H 57-58, 73 P.3d at 211 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
142. Id. 57, 73 P.3d at 211 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
143. Id. 64, 73 P.3d at 212 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
144. Id. 1 65-70, 73 P.3d at 212-14 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
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responsibilities.' 4 5 Justice Minzner justified her position by reasoning that, as a
practical matter, the Commission is the authorityon removal ofjudges, whereas the
New Mexico Supreme Court acts as only an appellate review of the Commission's
findings." 4 For these reasons, Justice Minzner found the Commission to be an
essential part of the Judicial Branch, and to allow the governor such power over it
would constitute an unconstitutional infringement.' 47
Justice Sema opposed this argument in his concurrence, stating several reasons
for his belief that "[t]he Commission does not exercise judicial power."'148 First,
Justice Serna argued that the state's judicial power was located only in the judicial
court system and the senate when dealing with impeachment.'4 9 Second, Justice
Serna reasoned that even by analogy "the Commission has no adjudicative
power."' 5 OThird, because there is no binding order previous to the supreme court's
ultimate disciplinary finding and the fact that it can introduce new evidence, the
traditional elements of appellate review are lacking for the Commission.' 5' Thus,
Justice Serna argued that, because the Commission does not exercise any judicial
function and is merely an advisory and investigatory panel, the governor did not
infringe on the Judicial Branch by removing the Commission members.'
Justice Minzner also agreed with Justice Bosson's argument that, because the
Commission is not executive, allowing the governor to remove its members would
overstep executive authority.' 5 3 Justice Minzner reasoned that because no "policymaking function of the Commission" had been articulated, it could be said that the

145. Id. 64, 73 P.3d at 211-12 (equating the support the legislature gave the supreme court through the
creation of the Commission to facilitate the court's powers and obligations to the administrative support the
legislature "has often provided.. .for the Governor's powers and obligations," through its creation of executive
commissions) (Minzner, J., dissenting).
61-63, 73 P.3d at 212 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
146. Id.
147. It is important to note that, in examining the location of the Commission, Justice Minzner cited to the
court's previous holding in In re Castellano, 119 N.M. 140, 142-43, 889 P.2d 175, 177-78 (1995), as it had
construed article VI, section 32. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 59, 73 P.3d at 211 (Minzner, J., dissenting). The
court there was asked to determine what the supreme court's power under article VI, section 32 was after the
addition of article VI, section 34, which defined vacancies in office for the purpose of filing a declaration of
candidacy, thus limiting how a judicial office could become vacant. In re Castellano, 119 N.M. at 142-43, 889
P.2d at 177-78. The issue in Castellanowas whether or not the supreme court was still permitted to remove ajudge
from office when recommended by the Commission. id. at 142, 889 P.2d at 177. The Castellanopetitioner argued
that, after article VI, section 34 was adopted, the supreme court lost its removal power because the provision did
not specifically list that a vacancy occurred when the court removed ajudge. Id. The Castellanocourt held that the
supreme court continued to have removal authority via the recommendations of the Commission because the
procedures to do so are found in the New Mexico Constitution under article VI, section 32, and, thus, those "other
portions of the Constitution fill any gap and otherwise make the legislative intent clear." Id. at 143, 889 P.2d at
178. Justice Minzner also found useful the Castellanocourt's description of the supreme court's removal powers
based on both "petition by the Judicial Standards Commission or under [our] superintending control," and the
court's characterization of both powers under article VI, section 32 as "alternative and cumulative with the
legislature's power of removal by impeachment." Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 1 59, 73 P.3d at 211 (Minzner, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Castellano, 119 N.M. at 143, 889 P.2d at 178).
148. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 38, 73 P.3d at 206 (Serna, J., concurring).
149. Id. (Serna, J., concurring) (citing N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 1).
150. Id. (Serna, J., concurring). Justice Serna found this a lack of adjudicative power in that the Commission
does not have power to enter or enforce judgments, construe or declare the law, or hold parties in contempt, which
are inherent judicial powers. Id.
151. Id. 39, 73 P.3d at 207 (Sema, J., concurring).
152. Id. H 38-39, 73 P.3d at 206-07 (Sema, J., concurring).
153. Id. 1 68, 73 P.3d at 213 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
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Commission is not charged with executing the duties and responsibilities of the
executive. 5 4 Justice Minzner reasoned that the constitution limited the removal
power here because it gave the New Mexico Supreme Court the power to review the
work of the Commission as part of the Judicial Branch, not the executive. 5
Justice Serna's concurrence addressed this argument in full. 56 Justice Serna
reasoned that because Article V does not limit the removal power to those that serve
on commissions within the Executive Branch, it allows removal of "any officer
appointed by [the executive].' ' 57 Therefore, Justice Serna reasoned that it does not
matter what role the Commission members serve; as they are undisputedly
5
gubernatorial appointees, the governor has the power to remove them. 1
However, Justice Minzner did not end her argument there, adding that the
constitution further limited the appointments onto the Commission by statute. 5 9 She
reasoned that to allow removal was contrary to those statutory provisions, and thus
would infringe on the Legislative Branch. " Justice Minzner contended that through
the interpretation of article VI and its implementing statutes there is no vacancy on
the Commission."'6 Thus, she concluded that allowing the governor to remove and
replace the lay members would "intrude on what appears to be the Legislature's
prerogative under the Constitution to provide for the appointment process.' 62
Furthermore, she stressed the importance of interpreting the constitution in this
instance correctly, because a mistake in the construction could only be fixed via
constitutional amendment.'63 Therefore, both Justice Bosson and Justice Minzner
concluded that the Commission is a creature of the Judicial Branch, and to allow the
governor to remove its lay members is unconstitutional as it allows infringement on
both the judicial and legislative branches. 164

154. Id. (Minzner, J., dissenting).
155. Id. 70, 73 P.3d at 213 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
156. Id. 37, 73 P.3d at 206 (Serna, J., concurring).
157. Id. (Sema, J., concurring) (quoting N.M. CONST. art. V, § 5).
158. Id. 1 37, 73 P.3d at 206. Furthermore, Justice Serna stated that, even if it were important to look at
whether or not the Commission served an executive function, he would not look for a possible policy-making
function but rather for a policy-executing function. Id. 37, 73 P.3d at 206 (Serna, J., concurring) (citing N.M.
CONST. art. V, § 4) (Justice Sema based this argument on the wording of article V, section 4, which states that the
governor's executive power is to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed."). Because the Commission
conducts investigations and files the petitions with the court for disciplinary action, which are policy-executing
functions, Justice Serna found that the Commission's "powers are as much quasi-executive as they are quasijudicial." Id. (Sema, J., concurring). Consequently, if it was important to look at whether or not the Commission
served an executive function, Justice Serna felt exercise of executive powers could clearly be found. Id. (Serna, J.,
concurring).
159. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017,1 71,73 P.3d at 214 (Minzner, J., dissenting). Article VI, section 32 allows
for appointments "as provided by law" and NMSA 1978, sections 34-10-1 to 34-10-2 are the statutes that
implement terms lengths and govern appointments and vacancies on the commission. Under these sections, there
are no provisions for the removal of commissioners by an appointment power; thus, Justice Minzner reasoned that
under the statutes appointments can only be made once the Commission certifies a vacancy. Id. (Minzner, J.,
dissenting); see also NMSA 1978, §§ 34-10-1 to 34-10-2; N.M. CONST. art VI, § 32.
160. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 171-73, 73 P.3d at 214 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
161. Id. 9173, 73 P.3d at 214 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
162. Id. (Minzner, J., dissenting).
163. Id. 1 74, 73 P.3d at 214 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
164. Justice Minzner also wrote on the task of interpreting the constitution. She stated that while often both
constitutional provisions and statutes are interpreted together, as was the case here, this does not mean that they
must be construed equally. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 74, 73 P.3d at 214 (Minzner, J., dissenting). Justice
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In Justice Serna' s concurrence he addressed Justice Minzner' s belief that if the
constitution is construed incorrectly it could be corrected only through
amendment.165 Justice Serna opined that this argument was incorrect because of the
wording of article V stating that removal is proper "unless otherwise provided by
law," which would allow the legislature to enact law that would limit the power
whenever it deemed such action necessary. " Thus, Justice Serna felt confident that,
it would address the matter, and that the
if the legislature found sufficient reason,
67
court should leave the issue alone.
V. ANALYSIS
In its analysis, the court majority made two contentions that weakened its
argument. First, it failed to adequately address the essence of the Denish opinion.
Second, it took an overly formalistic approach to the issue and thus narrowed the
constitutional role of the court in a separation of powers problem. While the dissent
also failed to use Denish to its full extent, its analysis was more functional, which
is more in-step with the current view that it is the essential role of the court to police
balance of powers issues.' 68
First, in its analysis of the effect staggered terms have on the removal power of
the executive, the entire court failed to adequately examine the Denish holding and
the important policies behind it.'69 The majority and dissenting opinions minimally
addressed the test set up in Denish to distinguish between formal and informal
staggering systems. 70 If the test had been used, the court would have found that the
Commission's staggered-term system was formal in nature.
In accordance with the test set forth in Denish, the Commission's implementing
statutes form a formal staggered-term system. 171 First, the statutes provide for a
system of staggered terms. 172 Second, they state the length of the full terms for
subsequent appointees.' 7 3 Third, the statute states that vacancies should be filled by
a person that will serve for "five years or less," indicating that replacements can
serve up to five years but may serve less, depending on when their predecessor's
Minzner opined that, when construing a constitutional provision, the view most similar to the view that was most
likely the intention of those who wrote the constitution should be adopted because of the difficulty in amending
constitutions. Id. (Minzner, J., dissenting). Based on the reference in article VI, section 32 to appointment in case
of vacancy, Justice Minzner believed it was most likely the view of the framers that continuity was sought because
of the stability and institutional memory it provided. Moreover, the governor's power to appoint the Commission
members was probably equated to that of his power to appoint judges and thus was meant to be limited to
appointment only, not removal. Id. 1 75, 73 P.3d at 214 (Minzner, J., dissenting). Thus, Justice Minzner dissented
from the majority, stating that she was "not persuaded that Article V, Section 5 was meant to give powers to the
executive extending beyond that Branch of government." Id. 1 76, 73 P.3d at 215 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
165. id. 36, 73 P.3d at 206 (Serna, J., concurring).
166. Id. (Serna, J., concurring) (quoting N.M. CONST. art. V, § 5).
167. Id. 1 36, 73 P.3d at 206 (Serna, J, concurring).
168. See State ex. rel. Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 570, 904 P.2d 11, 19 (1995) (stating that it is the
court's duty to establish the boundaries of the state constitution by the "yardstick of the constitution"); Dillon v.
King, 87 N.M. 79, 85, 529 P.2d 745, 751 (1974) (stating that it is the function and duty of the court to "say what
the law is and what the Constitution means").
169. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
171. See NMSA 1978, §§ 34-10-1 to 34-10-2; supra note 52.
172.
173.

NMSA 1978, § 34-10-1.
Id.
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term would have expired. 174 Moreover, the statute emphasizes that at least one of
the lay members' terms must expire on June thirtieth of each year, showing further
support for a stringent, formal staggered-term system.17
The majority in Espinosa never applied the Denish test for formal/informal
staggering but did find the purpose of the staggered-term system to be undermined
if the governor removed all the lay members of the Commission at one time. 176 The77
majority went on to find removal in this case was appropriate for several reasons. 1
These reasons do not stand up to close scrutiny.
The Espinosa majority's first contention, that staggered terms, if interpreted to
limit executive removal, would render the removal statute meaningless, is
unsupported by the Denish rationale. 178 The Denish court dealt with this issue by
distinguishing between formal and informal systems.' 79 Informal systems do not
fulfill the policies behind those that are staggered as fully as formal systems and,
thus, are not as highly protective of terms as are formal systems.' 0 As a result,
under Denish, removal can be used when dealing with informal systems but not
formal systems. Furthermore, the Denish court acknowledged how far reaching the
test articulated would be by acknowledging that formal staggering may be the only
system used in New Mexico,' 8 indicating that the Denish court clearly thought out
what effect the test it was articulating would have.
Second, the Espinosa majority distinguished Denish on a technicality that is
secondary to the important staggered-system analysis, which was not really, in the
end, a clear distinction from the facts of Espinosa.In distinguishing Denish from
the facts of Espinosa,the majority reasoned that Denish dealt with an attempt by the
governor to alter the term length, not the removal power. 18 2 While the facts of
Denish did deal with the length of terms, the court there went deeply into the
analysis of staggered terms and why they are important; thus, the term-length
holding is secondary to the analysis of Denishfor purposes here. 83
' Furthermore, the
Denish holding was based on deviations from the formal staggering system, which
the court there held were not permitted."I
Moreover, the term-length distinction made by the Espinosa majority does not
distinguish it from Denish, as Espinosa, like Denish, deals with deviations from a
formal staggered-term system due to altered term length.8 5 When the governor
removed the lay members in Espinosa,the terms of the commissioners all ended in
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id.
Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 1 20, 73 P.3d at 202-03.
Id. 1 21, 73 P.3d at 203; see supra text accompanying notes 72-80.

178. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
180. See Denish, 1996-NMSC-005, V 39-40, 910 P.3d at 924.
181. Id. 1 42, 910 P.2d at 925. The Denish court noted that in its decision it was only dealing with the
staggered-term system for the board of regents and thus had no basis to examine informal staggered-term systems
in New Mexico. This suggests that it was addressing formal systems because that was the type of system used by
the board of regents, not informal, thus strengthening the argument that its holding applied to all formal staggeredterm systems. Denish, 1996-NMSC-005, 42, 910 P.2d at 925.
182. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 21, 73 P.3d at 203.
183. Denish, 1996-NMSC-005, if 34-44, 910 P.2d at 923-26.
184. Id. 44, 910 P.2d at 925.
185. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 21, 73 P.3d at 203.
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March of 2003.186 Removal on this date altered the length of all the original terms
to end at that time instead of when they were meant to end.' 87 Thus, the distinction
made by the court between the two cases is not profound enough to discount the
Denish court's reasoning.
Also, while the Espinosa majority held otherwise, the important policies behind
the Denish formal/informal test should have been enough to limit the executive's
removal power. The formal system found in the Commission's implementing
statutes indicates, according to the reasoning in Denish, that the policies the system
supports are extremely important.188 The Espinosa majority noted the importance
of these policies but then went on to hold that such policy reasons could not
"override the Governor's express removal authority. ' 89 Other jurisdictions that
have dealt with the same issue do not agree,' 90 holding that the governor has no
inherent power to remove a public officer when the appointment is made under a
statute providing for a fixed or staggered tenure.191
In particular, Pennsylvania courts have consistently found that the governor cannot92
remove, without cause, appointees who serve under these staggered-term systems.'

186. Respondents' Response at 2, Espinosa (No. 28,040).
187. The lay members' terms would have expired one at a time on June thirtieth of each of the next six years.
NMSA 1978, § 34-10-1(A).
188. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
189. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 22, 73 P.3d at 203.
190. Also, in New Mexico, previous to statehood, the importance of separation of powers as applied to
instances when the executive sought to remove appointees who served fixed terms was noted in Territory ex rel.
Wade v. Ashenfelter, 4 N.M. 93, 12 P. 879 (1887). There the governor was seeking to remove one of the territory's
district attorneys whom he had nominated for the position. Id. at 93, 12 P. at 880. The court held that the governor
did not have any common law or statutory power to remove ajudicial officer holding office for a fixed term before
that term had expired. Id. 12 P. at 897. This supports the notion that the executive would violate separation of
powers principles if that office removed a person from a position for which terms were fixed by the legislature.
191. See Holder v. Anderson, 128 S.E. 181 (Ga. 1925) (holding that the governor did not have the power to
remove the chairman of the state highway commission as the statute creating the office provided a fixed term);
Watson v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n, 125 A.2d 354 (Pa. 1956) (holding the governor cannot remove a member of the
Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission without cause because appointees serve fixed terms that rotate allowing only
one new appointee at a time); State ex rel. Lyon v. Rhame, 75 S.E. 881 (S.C. 1912) (holding that the governor had
no authority to remove the state bank examiner, an executive appointee, as his term was fixed by the legislature
at four years). While there are cases in other states upholding removal over fixed terms as evidenced in Mitchell
v. King, 537 F.2d 385, 389 (10th Cir. 1976), each case cited in that opinion is easily distinguished from the case
at hand. All of the statutes dealt with in the cases cited in Mitchell either specifically allowed for removal, showed
clear legislative intent to limit removal, or dealt only with fixed, not staggered, terms. None of these situations
applies to the provisions at question in Espinosa.See Beasley v. Parnell, 9 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Ark. 1928) (holding that
the governor had removal authority because the statute appointed a commissioner to be appointed for four years
or until his successor is appointed by the governor, indicating the intent of the legislature to not limit the removal
power); State ex rel. Ayers v. Kipp, 74 N.W. 440, 441 (S.D. 1898) (holding that the governor has the power to
remove a commissioner of insurance based on the wording in the statute making terms of two years unless the commissioner is removed by the governor); Townsend v. Kurtz, 34 A. 1123, 1127 (Md. 1896) (holding that when a
statute for a fixed-term office does not expressly give the governor removal power, but the legislature has not expressly said that the removal should only be for cause, this allows the governor to remove at will); State ex rel.
Mcreavy v. Burke, 36 P. 281 (Wash. 1894) (holding that the governor could remove the members of the State
Capitol Commission because the creating provision setting up the terms also allowed for removal for cause by the
governor).
192. Watson v. Pa. Tpk. Comm'n, 125 A.2d 354, 357 (Pa. 1956); see also Pievsky v. Ridge, 98 F.3d 730,
738-39 (3d Cir. 1996) (according to Pennsylvania law, the governor has the power to remove a member of the
Delaware River Port Authority because they serve only fixed, not staggered, terms); Slonaker v. Maddy, No. 92-C2876, 1993 WL 840529, at *4 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Dec. 23, 1993) (holding that a township cannot remove members
of the Civil Service Commission without cause because they serve fixed, staggered terms).
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In Bowers v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board,193 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court based its holding on statutory construction. The court reasoned that every act
should give effect to all of its provisions and that to ignore the fixed staggered terms
set up by the legislature would allow that section of the act to become a "mere
fiction,"' 194 a charge that might legitimately be made against the result in Espinosa.
The Espinosa majority applied the legislative intent behind the use of staggered
terms in a way differing from that of the Pennsylvania court. The Espinosa majority
stated that allowing staggered terms to limit the removal authority would render the
removal power meaningless because all executive commission appointees in New
Mexico serve under a formal staggered-term system.' 95 The Pennsylvania court,
however, stated that the legislature's use of staggered terms shows the intent to limit
the executive removal authority, 96 which is compatible with Denish. 97 The
Espinosa majority was able to point out, however, that staggering alone is not
enough to show clear legislative intent to limit the executive removal power when,
as in New Mexico, so many of the boards that use staggered terms also include
express language limiting removal. 98 This supports the argument that the majority
in Espinosa felt the removal power is more important than the policies behind
staggered-term systems.
While this was an important point to make because so many New Mexico
commissions use staggered terms, there is still a failing in the Espinosa majority's
rationale. When a commission is located and functions in the Judicial Branch, it
would seem that the policies behind staggered terms are even more vital than when
used in purely executive commissions. Thus, such policies should be more protected
when applied to the Commission than the court is allowing for here.
Another weakness in the majority's opinion is its strict formalistic analysis of the
separation of powers issue.' 99 It is the function of the Commission that is most
material to the analysis of whether the executive can remove appointees." ° Other
jurisdictions have repeatedly found that limitation on the executive's removal power
depends on the function of the branch of government removal is being exercised
over.20 ' Espinosa ultimately rejects this analysis by rooting its holding in the
conclusion that the governor's express power cannot be impliedly limited by the
function of the Commission. 2

193. 167 A.2d 480 (Pa. 1961).
194. Bowers, 167 A.2d at 483.
195. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 21, 73 P.3d at 203.
196. Sortino v. Singley, 392 A.2d 1337, 1339 (Pa. 1978) (holding that the mayor did not have the authority
to remove members of the Urban Redevelopment Authority without cause because the appointees served fixed
staggered terms).
197. Denish, 1996-NMSC-005, U 41-44, 910 P.2d at 924-26 (stating that the intent and effect of the
legislation at question was to create a formal staggering system and, thus, all later terms should be defined by this
system).
198. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 22, 73 P.3d at 203 (referring to N.M. CONST. art. V, § 14 and N.M.
CONST. art. XII, § 13 as examples).
199. Id. n 14-17, 73 P.3d at 201-02.
200. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935).
201. Id. at 631-32.
202. Espinosa,2003-NMSC-017, g 24-25, 73 P.3d at 203-04.
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In its formalistic approach, the Espinosa majority glosses over the necessary
20 3
functional argument through its analysis of both State ex rel. Ulrick v. Sanchez
and State ex rel. Duran v. Anaya.2 4 The majority used both prior cases to "indicate
that the Governor has plenary authority to remove his appointees unless the
Legislature has imposed an express limit on that power., 20 5 But, as Justice Bosson
states in his dissent, both cases used by the majority deal with removal power over
appointees in clearly executive entities, while the current case deals with appointees
to the Judicial Branch.2 06 The Espinosa majority glosses over the functional
argument, stating that such analysis is not needed; Justice Bosson, however,
recognized the inherent problem in doing so when he noted that the "critical
distinction between this case and the authorities relied on by the majority lies in the
fundamental constitutional principle of separation of powers. 2 °7 By avoiding the
functional analysis used in other jurisdictions, the New Mexico court gives short
shrift to the inherent separation of powers issues in this case.
Other states, as well as the federal courts, have not been so willing to disregard
the functional argument.0 8 The leading case on the issue is Humphrey's Executor
v. United States,2 9 where the U.S. Supreme Court first articulated the functional
rule that limits on the executive's removal power depend on the "character of the
' Then, fifty-three years later,
office. 210
in Morrison v. Olson,2 t the Supreme Court
clarified the meaning of "character of the office" by basing the analysis on the
separation of powers principles. The Court in Morrison found that the analysis to
be used in such cases examines both the effect the limits on removal will have on
the executive and the effects removal will have on the branch of government to
which removal is applied.21 2
The Espinosa majority's holding might have been very different had it used
similar analysis. Initially, both the federal and state cases that have dealt with
executive removal power have not applied it to appointees that are located in the
Judicial Branch, but only to executive entities that serve quasi-judicial functions.2" 3

203. 32 N.M. 265, 255 P. 1077 (1962); see supra notes 106-112 and accompanying text.
204. 102 N.M. 609, 698 P.2d. 882 (1985); see supra notes 106-112 and accompanying text.
205. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017,
25-26, 73 P.3d at 204.
206. Id. 1 51, 73 P.3d at 209 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
207. Id. 1 52, 73 P.3d at 209 (Bosson, J.,
dissenting).
208. See generally Humphrey's, 295 U.S. at 631 (holding that the president's power to remove members of
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is limited in part because the FTC exercises quasi-legislative and quasijudicial functions and, thus, must be free from executive control); Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356
(1958) (holding that the president could not remove members of the War Claims Commission because of the
commission's adjudicatory nature); Rice v. Underwood, 517 S.E.2d 751, 761 (W. Va. 1998) (holding that the
governor's removal power over the members of the Racing Commission was not limited because, although the
commission performed some quasi-judicial functions, it was not judicial in nature but rather functioned more
within the Executive Branch); Lunding v. Walker, 359 N.E.2d 96,98-101 (111.1976) (holding that the governor's
removal power was limited in its application to the State Board of Elections because of the independent nature of
the board).
209. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
210. Humphrey's, 195 U.S. at 631.
211. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
212. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 690-91 (dealing with the question of whether restrictions on the executive
removal power as enacted by Congress were unconstitutional); see, e.g., Rice, 517 S.E.2d at 761; Lunding, 359
N.E.2d at 98-100.
213. See Humphrey's, 195 U.S. at 631; Wiener, 357 U.S. at 356; Lunding, 359 N.E.2d at 98-100; Ford v.
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Therefore, if the executive removal power is limited when applied to a quasijudicial office, then surely the removal power should be limited as to an office
located within the Judicial Branch itself, such as the New Mexico Judicial
Standards Commission.
Furthermore, if the Espinosacourt had applied the Morrisonanalysis,2" 4 it would
have found the effect on the Executive Branch of government would be minimal if
it could not remove the lay members of the Commission. When examining the facts
of Espinosa,it is clear that the executive would not be inhibited from accomplishing
its constitutionally assigned function if it could not remove the lay members. Under
the New Mexico Constitution, it is the executive's duty to ensure that "the laws be
faithfully executed."2 5 To aid in this duty, the governor uses executive commissions
and committees, to which he often appoints all, or the majority of, the members.2" 6
These commissions help create and enforce the policies of the administration.2 17
The principal idea behind the executive's removal power over these commissions
is that it is the governor who is held responsible to the sovereignty for the errors of
the administration. 1 8
However, the Judicial Standards Commission is not comparable to those other
executive commissions. Its only function is to aid the New Mexico Supreme Court
in its critical review of the Judicial Branch.2 19 While intermingling between the
branches has historically been allowed, infringement has not. 22' As a result, while
the Executive Branch is allowed to intermingle with the Judicial Branch by
appointing the majority of the members to the Commission, it is not allowed to
infringe on the "central mission of the Judiciary" 22 1 or impede its essential
functions. 222 Furthermore, the function of the executive will not be impeded if that
office cannot remove its appointees to the Commission.223
Here, the duties of the executive will not be infringed upon if the governor
cannot remove the lay members of the Commission. As Justice Minzner stated, the
Commission is not "charged with following the policies of the Governor in
executing either duties imposed upon that agency by statute or responsibilities and

Balgojevich, 282 F. Supp. 2d 898 (D.C.D. 1. 2003). But see Rice, 517 S.E.2d at 761; Swan v. Clinton, 932 F.
Supp. 8 (D.D.C. 1996).
214. See supra notes 211-212 and accompanying text.
215. N.M. CONST. art. V, § 4.
216. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 6-1-1 (1923) (creating a State Board of Finance); NMSA 1978, § 9-5B-5
(1992) (creating a Youth Conservation Corps); NMSA 1978, § 9-7-11.2 (1991) (creating a New Mexico Health
Policy Commission); NMSA 1978, § 9-15-45 (1994) (creating an Economic Development Commission); NMSA
1978, § 11-3A-6 (1994) (creating a Regional Housing Board of Commissioners); NMSA 1978, § 12-3-15 (1997)
(creating a Statuary Hall Commission).
217. See Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 51, 73 P.3d at 209 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
218. Ulrick, 32 N.M. at 289-90, 255 P. at 1086 (citing Bynum v. Strain, 95 Okla. 45, 218 P. 883 (1923)).
219. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32.
220. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (while the "Constitution mandates that 'each of
the three general departments of government [must remain] entirely free from the control or coercive influence.. .of
either of the others.. .the Framers did not require.. that the three Branches must be entirely separate and distinct")
(citations omitted).
221. Id. at 388.
222. Id. at 384-90.
223. See State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 120 N.M. 562, 574-75,904 P.2d 11, 22-23 (1995) (discussing the
importance of the degree to which the acts of one branch of government disrupt the function of another); Espinosa,
2003-NMSC-017, U 65-66, 73 P.3d at 212-13 (Minzner, J., dissenting) (citing N.M. CONST. art. III, § 1).
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duties inherent in the office of the Governor. 22 4 Justice Bosson also emphasized
that the Commission does not serve a policy-making role that implements the
initiatives of any one branch of government. 2 5 Justice Serna rebutted this argument
by stating that the Commission does serve the executive function of executing the
laws, as it is given "quasi-prosecution" powers that allow it to file petitions for
discipline, retirement, or removal. 26 There are several limitations to Justice Serna' s
argument.
While it is true that the Commission can file such petitions, it does so only after
conducting investigations and hearings, as well as making findings. 227 These
hearings relate to specific charges against individual judges, not to general policies
regarding the execution of the laws. 228 The judges being investigated are in charge
of reviewing the law; thus, the allegations against the judges and justices relate to
inadequate review of the laws of the state, not the execution of them. As a result,
the powers of the Commission are essential to the judiciary in protection of its
independence and integrity229 and are not executive in nature.
Also, while executive commissions have the power to implement policy themselves or through the Office of the Governor, 230 the Judicial Standards Commission
has no such power. The Commission can only recommend disciplinary measures to
the supreme court; it is up to the court to make the final determination. 23' Therefore,
the Commission itself has no quasi-prosecution power because it is only making
recommendations, not actually enforcing them. Justice Minzner solidified this
argument when she equated the supreme court review of the Commission findings
to appellate review and discussed the support the Commission gives the Judicial
Branch.232
On the other hand, Justice Serna argued that the Commission "does not exercise
judicial power. '233 In doing so, he took a narrow formalistic approach to the

224. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 1 68, 73 P.3d at 213 (Minzner, J., dissenting).
225. Id. 1 52, 73 P.3d at 209 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
226. Id. 1 37, 73 P.3d at 206 (Serna, J., concurring).
227. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32.
228. See 2002 JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMM'N ANN. REP. 19-46 (discussing the individual proceedings
before the Commission and the Commission proceedings before the supreme court).
229. See JudicialRemoval, supra note 37, at 1005 (discussing who best can administer judicial discipline
and its importance to judicial legitimacy); Commission Removal Plan,supra note 37, at 1020-21 (stating that it
is "essential" for judges to be disciplined in a way that does not threaten the independence of the Judicial Branch);
Joseph Michael Norwood, ConstitutionalRevision-JudicialRemoval and Discipline-TheCaliforniaCommission
Planfor New Mexico, 9 NAT. RESOURCES J. 446, 446-67 (1969) (stating that the discipline of judges cannot
disrupt the freedom of the judiciary from control of other branches, respect from the citizenry, and freedom of the
individual judge); Remedies, supranote 37, at 150 (discussing the importance ofjudicial independence).
230. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 60-2A-3 (1980) (creating the New Mexico Athletic Commission and attaching
it to the Department of Business Licenses); NMSA 1978, § 61-9-5 (2003) (stating that the state board of
psychologist examiners is administratively attached to the regulation and licensing department); NMSA 1978, §
61-31-7 (1989) (creating a board of social work examiners and administratively attaching it to the department of
Professional and Occupational Licenses); NMSA 1978, § 61-17A-6 (1993) (creating a board of barbers and
cosmetologists and administratively attaching it to the regulation and licensing department).
231. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32.
232. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, In 63-64,73 P.3d at 212 (Minzner, J., dissenting) (stating that the supreme
court reviews the findings and conclusions of the Commission in the same fashion as an appellate court would
review a district court judgment and the Commission provides administrative support to the supreme court in the
same way that executive commissions provide administrative support to the governor).
233. Id. 38, 73 P.3d at 206 (Sema, J., concurring).
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definition of judicial power. Justice Serna based his interpretation on the constitution's language, which states that judicial power rests in the courts of the judiciary
and senate, for impeachment purposes, not the Commission.234 As a result, he felt
the Commission has no adjudicative power because it cannot enter or enforce
judgements and does not construe the law.235 He further argued that "[t]he fact that
the Constitution allows [the New Mexico Supreme] Court to 'permit the introduction of additional evidence' in reviewing a recommendation of the Commission
conclusively establishes that this Court does not act in an appellate role. '23 6 Thus,
he concluded that the supreme court decides judicial discipline as an original
matter.237
There are several drawbacks to this narrow, formalistic argument. First, the 1964
and 1967 reports of the Constitutional Revision Commissions made clear that the
quasi-judicial
different fromlaidother
a role Commissions
Commission was intended to serve
out charts of the
Revision
administrative agencies.238 Both

Judicial System of New Mexico, as it was, and as it would be, if the Judicial
Standards Commission was incorporated. Of importance here is the 1967 chart,
which accompanied the provision adopted into the New Mexico Constitution. 239 The
1967 chart shows the Judicial Standards Commission as a special arm of the
supreme court. 240 This chart further supports Justice Minzner's argument that the
Commission exists as an essential support mechanism for the supreme court in
exercising its essential functions.2 4'
Second, the argument that the Commission has no adjudicatory power because
the supreme court remains the ultimate decision maker rings hollow. While it is the
supreme court that makes the final determination, the Commission must first bring
its recommendations to the court. 242 Without the Commission, the supreme court
would have absolutely no power to discipline judges, because prior to its creation
the only way to remove a judge was through legislative impeachment. 24 3 As a result,
the Commission plays a vital role in this area. While the Commission itself may not
have traditional adjudicatory power, it is through the Commission that the supreme
court exercises its power over these matters. Therefore, the Commission does take
on a critical adjudicatory role in its special relationship with the supreme court.

234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. (Sema, J., concurring).
Id. (Sema, J., concurring).
Id. 1 39, 73 P.3d at 207 (Serna, J., concurring) (citing N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32).
Id. (Sema, J., concurring).

238.

1964 N.M. CONST. REVISION COMM'N REP. 34-35; 1967 N.M. CONST. REViSIONCOMM'N REP. 100-01.

Both reports included charts showing the Commission as an immediate branch off of the supreme court, in contrast
to quasi-judicial state agencies, which were branches off of the state district courts. See Appendix A.
239. 1967 N.M. CONST. REVISION COMM'N REP. 100-01; see Appendix A.
240. 1967 N.M. CONST. REVISION COMM'N REP. 100-01; see Appendix A.
241. See Appendix A.
242. N.M. CONST. art. VI, § 32.
243. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 10, 73 P.3d at 200. While legislative impeachment was the only way to
remove a judge at this time, the Board of Bar Commissioners had authority over judges as members of the bar and,
thus, they could be disciplined through the board as well. Petition of Bd. of Comm'rs of State Bar, 65 N.M. 332,
333, 337 P.2d 400, 401 (1959).
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Furthermore, as raised by Justice Serna, while the supreme court may consider
additional evidence, 244 it is important to note how rare it is for the court to disregard
the Commission's recommendations. Since the Commission's formation in 1968,
the supreme court has heard sixty-four Commission proceedings. 245 Of those sixtyfour, the court has rejected the Commission's recommendation only four times. 2 6
This supports the idea that the court looks with high regard on the Commission's
findings and defers to Commission judgments concerning judicial discipline.
Finally, the majority failed to adequately examine the effect removal would have
on the Judicial Branch. Instead it stated that it is up to the legislature to determine
if the governor acted with ill motive and change the law to protect the independence
of the judiciary.247 Judicial independence has been stated as being "the very
foundation of the American federal and state constitutional systems. 248 This
independence is vital in allowing judges to apply the law without showing favor to
any of the parties involved and without fear of reprisal.249 One of the main reasons
for creation of the Judicial Standards Commission, and similar commissions in
other states, was to protect this independence by ensuring that the supreme court has
at its disposal the means to effectively discipline, a necessity to protect the integrity
of the Judicial Branch.
Such commissions were created across the country because of the failings of
other forms of discipline and removal. Until the creation of the first of such
commissions in California in 1960,251 impeachment was the primary type of removal
stmta
system,252 a system
that has come to be seen as insufficient to protect Judicial
Branch integrity.25 3 Such failings are evidenced in the sparse use of impeachment
in both the federal and state context.254 Such sparse use of impeachment is due in
large part to the highly partisan nature of impeachment.255 Also, legislative bodies

244. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 139, 73 P.3d at 207 (Sema, J., concurring).
245. 2002 JUDICIAL STANDARDS COMM'N ANN. REP.35-46.

246. Id.
247. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017,
30-31,73 P.3d at 205.
248. See Commission Removal Plan, supra note 37, at 1020-21 (discussing possibilities for review of
judicial misconduct in Iowa)7
249. Id. at 1021.
250. See id. at 1020-23; 1964 N.M. CONST. REVISION COMM'N REP. 31-32. As stated by the authors in the
Harvard Law Review, judicial review commissions were created to address the "tension between the need for
judicial independence on the one hand, and judicial legitimacy on the other." See JudicialRemoval, supra note
36, at 1005.
251. See Commission Removal Plan, supra note 37, at 1030.
252. Robert R. Davis, Jr., The ChandlerIncident and Problems of JudicialRemoval, 19 STAN. L. REV. 448,
451 (1966) (discussing problems with removal procedures for both state and federal judges).
253. Note, Removal of FederalJudges-Alternatives to Impeachment, 20 VAND. L. REV. 723, 723 (1967)
[hereinafterAlternatives to Impeachment] (quoting Letter from President Jefferson to William Branch Giles, April
20, 1807, in 11JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1191 (1904) (describing impeachment as a "bungling way of removing
judges.. .an impracticable thing-a mere scarecrow")).
254. See Davis, supra note 252, at 455 (stating that up until 1960 only eight federal judges had been
impeached by the House of Representatives, and only seventeen states, on fifty-two occasions, had attempted
impeachment) (citations omitted).
255. Id. (discussing the federal impeachment of Halsted Ritter, District Judge for the Southern District of
Florida, in which, of the fifty-six votes for conviction, only five were from members of Ritter's same political
party); see also Alternatives to Impeachment, supra note 253, at 724 (stating that impeachment has not been free
of political bias); Commission Removal Plan, supranote 37, at 1026 (stating that impeachment is ineffective in
part due to the fact that the state legislature is too partisan); JudicialRemoval, supra note 37, at 1008-09 (The vast
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are not well suited for impeachment hearings, which results in the unfair prosecution of judges.25 6
Reform in the way judicial misconduct was handled came from a reaction to the
need to protect judges from arbitrary dismissal, while also protecting the Judicial
Branch's integrity. 25 7 This reform resulted in the formation of judicial standards
commissions. 258 Moreover, concerns for arbitrary dismissal and protection of the
independence of the Judicial Branch led to the adoption of plans that included lay
members as a way to insulate the "removal mechanism from both direct and indirect
political control," and ensure legitimacy. 259 To ensure legitimacy of the removal
system to the public, and thus protect the judiciary's integrity, it was determined
that the disciplinary bodies could not be governed only by members of the Judicial
Branch. 26' To do so would leave the entity open to "natural public skepticism. "261
Also, to protect the independence of the judiciary, such commissions had to have
diverse membership, "so that pressure that might affect some members probably
will not affect others. 262 Including members of the judiciary along with lay
members allowed for the inclusion of opinions from outside thejudiciary, while still
allowing peer review from other members of the judiciary. 263 To some, the most
optimal membership on a judicial review commission would be members of the
"bench, bar, and general public," but never giving the bench the majority of the
seats. 264 Thus, the lay members of such commissions were obviously seen as an
important part of the new system for review of judges.
In addition to the general attitude of the time, that the new judicial review
commissions needed to be independent and thus include lay members, the New
Mexico Legislature assured the Commission's independence by using a staggeredterm system. 265 It is this independence that is threatened by the governor's ability
to remove all of the Commission's lay members at one time. Allowing the governor

majority of currently operating removal systems are unsatisfactory as overly subject to political control.").
256. Jack E. Frankel, Removal of Judges-Federaland State, 36 PENN. B. ASSN. Q. 284, 286 (1964) (As
Hatton Sumners, a former Chairman of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives, stated, "The
Senators are busy legislators, not Judges. Whether or not a Judge is guilty of bad conduct, for which under the
Constitution he loses his right to hold office, is a justifiable question. The attempt to have the Senate properly try
these removal cases, called impeachments, utterly fails." (quoting 13 PENN. BAR ASSN. Q. 150 (1942) Bill H.R.
146, Sumners)); see also Davis, supranote 252, at 456 (discussing how "[i]mpeachment trials.. give inadequate
protection to the accused judge); Alternatives to Impeachment, supranote 253, at 724 (stating that the legislators
who hear impeachments have many other commitments and may therefore make their decision on the guilt or
innocence of the tried judge based on "superficial knowledge of the evidence presented").
257. See generally Commission Removal Plan, supra note 37; JudicialRemoval, supranote 37; Remedies,
supra note 37; Alternatives to Impeachment,supra note 253.
258. See generally Commission Removal Plan,supra note 37; JudicialRemoval, supra note 37; Remedies,
supra note 37; Alternatives to Impeachment,supra note 253.
259. See JudicialRemoval, supra note 37, at 1008-09.
260. See id. at 1009.
261. Id.
262. See Remedies, supra note 37, at 183 (discussing the California commission and instances of political
pressure attempts on it).
263. See Commission Removal Plan,supra note 37, at 1032.
264. See JudicialRemoval, supra note 37, at 1010-11.
265. 1964 N.M. CONST. REvISION COMM'N REP. 30 (stating that "[iln order to achieve an efficient and well
disciplined judicial system possessing the highest degree of integrity, it is felt that an independent commission on
thejudiciary is necessary..."); NMSA 1978, § 34-10-1 to 34-10-2 (the provision's implementing statutes that form
a system of formal staggered terms for the lay members).
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to remove all the lay members and replace them with his own appointees opens up
the possibility that the Executive Branch will be able to control the decisions of the
Commission, because the majority of the members will be closely linked to that
office.266 This goes against the principle that members of the Commission "should
be as free as possible from political pressure. '"267
Thus, the Espinosacourt's rationale is flawed in several ways. Both the majority
and minority opinions failed to deal with the essence of the Denish opinion by not
applying its formal and informal test. In doing so, the court did not give the policies
behind staggered terms the protection they deserve, especially when applied to an
entity located outside the Executive Branch in the judiciary. Furthermore, the
narrow formalistic approach taken by the majority and concurring opinions toward
the article V removal power failed to offer the protection the judiciary should have
been afforded. As a result, the Espinosa court imprudently left the integrity of the
judiciary open to executive control through its power over the judiciary's integral
disciplinary entity, the Commission.
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION
The implications of this case are far reaching. First, Espinosa may have set a
precedent for other states that have commissions similar to the New Mexico Judicial
Standards Commission. Up to this point, no other state governor had tried to apply
the removal power to such commissions.2 68 As a result of the holding here, other
state judicial review commissions with executive appointee members may be
threatened with complete removal whenever a new governor is appointed.
The local effects may be even more pernicious. First, the court's narrow reading
of Denish has undermined the effect of staggered terms. The legislature thus may
no longer limit the governor from removing at will without expressly stating so.
This may be difficult as the governor must first approve and sign off on every law,
and any governor may be less likely to sign bills that expressly limit his/her
power.2 69
Second, the Espinosa ruling gives the current governor and future governors
large discretion over the composition of the Judicial Standards Commission. Any
governor now has the power to appoint the majority of the positions on the
Commission. While the majority found no ill will in Governor Richardson's
appointment, Justice Bosson properly noted, "In interpreting the Constitution, we
write for the future, not just the present. '270 No matter what the current intentions
are, allowing such control of the Commission by one political office can create a
dangerous situation in the future and is contrary to separation of powers ideals.271

266. See Remedies, supra note 37, at 196 (stating that to protect the judiciary's independence the executive
and legislative branches should not be given the power to initiate removals or reprimands).
267. Id.
268. See Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 1 53, 73 P.3d at 210 (Bosson, J., dissenting); Massey, supra note 4.
269. The governor has the power to veto any bill. While the veto can be overcome by a two-thirds majority
vote in the legislature, the threat of veto is still enough to probably limit the legislature's willingness to pursue such
limitations on executive power. N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 22.
270. Espinosa, 2003-NMSC-017, 56, 73 P.3d at 210 (Bosson, J., dissenting).
271. See id. 56, 73 P.3d at 210; Kate Nash, JudicialPanel Resignations Upheld, ALBUQUERQUE J., July,
3, 2003, at D3, available at 2003 WL 57889189.
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Furthermore, true intentions are often hard to discern when only looking at one
specific issue. While not suggesting that Governor Richardson had ill motives in
replacing the majority of the Commission, since his inauguration, the governor has
taken action to centralize and strengthen the Executive Branch. Not only was he
able to appoint all new lay members to the Commission, but he also persuaded the
populace to abolish the State School Board and replace it with an executive
commission.272 Further, he convinced the legislature to give him control over the
New Mexico Transportation Commission.273
In making all of these changes, the governor had the support of the people of
New Mexico, the supreme court, and the legislature. However, putting so much
power in one branch may have future consequences. For the moment, such changes
are giving the people of New Mexico accountability, in that, if there are problems
in these areas, it is the governor who is held responsible. However, the issue
remains as to how the changes made now will affect New Mexico in the future. The
constitution is designed to be the protector for future generations and is threatened
by the Espinosaholding. Thus, while Governor Richardson is highly popular and
trusted274by the electorate, as reporter Larry Calloway says, "what about the next
guy?"

272. S.J. Res. 2, 5, 12 & 21, 46th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2003) (as amended), available at http://web.state
.nm.us/Election/CA1 .pdf.
273. S.B. 652, 46th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2003); Larry Calloway, Remodeling Office of the Governor,
ALBUQUERQUEJ., Dec. 28,2003, at B2, availableat 2003 WL70735662. In taking over the highway commission,
the governor eliminated the provision stating that commissioners could only be removed for "incompetence, neglect
of duty or malfeasance," replacing it with "shall serve at the pleasure of the governor." S.B. 652, 46th Leg., 1st
Sess. (N.M. 2003).
274. Larry Calloway, Remodeling Office of the Governor, ALBUQUERQUEJ., Dec. 28, 2003, at B2, available
at 2003 WL 70735662.
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